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The United Kingdom (UK) and Republic of Ireland provide two distinctive cases for those 
investigating the role of religion in the politics and government of the European Union (EU). 
In particular, we can examine the relevance of faith-based values to the policy preferences 
of British and Irish Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) via an analysis of the 
responses to a Europe-wide survey questionnaire – the first of its kind, generating a 
representative cross-section of elite opinion. Across a range of competences and issues, we 
can detect a consistent desire on the part of the EU’s elected party politicians to maintain a 
separation of church and state, and an ability to distinguish between religious beliefs and 
political actions. MEPs appear to be moderate in their views on religion and close to the 
centre of wider public opinion. A common sentiment present in the answers to many of the 
questions is that, while churches or faith-based organisations should be respected equally, 
they should not exert undue political influence. The paper argues that this stance can be 






Religion helps to defines Europe, but plays a much more ambiguous role in the European 
Union (EU). The EU has repeatedly displayed a determination to remain formally secular, 
mimicking a French-style laïcité in both its treaties and directives. However, the logic of this 
policy of separating church and state has become more strained since the European 
Commission and European Parliament have started to legislate increasingly in areas of social 
policy and human rights, complementing their traditional interest in trade and economic 
affairs. Some commentators question the success of the EU in finding the right balance 
between promoting religious freedoms and protecting freedom from religion (see Foret and 
Itçaina 2011). So despite the fact that Christianity has its institutional home in Europe, 
contributing substantially in the process to what constitutes the core of European identity, 
the role of churches and faith-based organisations in European integration and multi-level 
governance appears to be highly complex.  
 Perhaps the most visible formal link between religion and politics in the EU can be 
found in the chamber of the European Parliament. In particular, we can identify the work of 
the European People’s Party (EPP), the political movement that brings together Members of 
the European Parliament (MEPs) who are Christian Democrats, and which presently 
constitutes the largest elected group with 270 members. Not only does the EPP seek to 
promote values and policies which have a religious origin (albeit not as centrally as it once 
did – see Duncan 2006), its members operate within the confines of the European 
Parliament, the arena of the EU which focuses most on issues related to human rights, 
political culture and national identity. While other parts of the European Quarter of Brussels 
are preoccupied with trade agreements, tariffs and agricultural quotas, those who operate 
within the Espace Léopold, as well as in the main plenary hemisphere in Strasbourg, have 
always sought to interpret their remit in a way that represents the concerns of ordinary 
European citizens and wider European civil society.  
 Interestingly, then, as a consequence, both the UK and Ireland provide important 
case studies when analysing the influence of the religious beliefs of MEPs on their political 
behaviour, due to the noticeable absence of Christian Democrat politicians elected in these 
two member states. In Britain, the centre-right party, the Conservatives, have no ideological 
links at all with Christian Democracy, and their MEPs even sit in an entirely different party 
group in the European Parliament chamber, the European Conservatives and Reformists 
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(ECR). This move came about as a result of increasing Euro-scepticism in the party, and a 
growing unease at being part of the group that formally describes itself as ‘Europe’s Driving 
Force’ (European People’s Party 2013). While four Irish MEPs from the political party, Fine 
Gael, do work under the umbrella of the EPP, they would also hold significant ideological 
differences from mainstream European Christian Democracy (see Gallagher and Marsh 
2002). So how does that core point impact upon the various policy interests of these MEPs 
representing constituencies from across the UK and Republic of Ireland?  
 Furthermore, how do the British MEPs who are members of the other political 
groups like the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) or the Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) relate to this distinctive political context? The 
secular tradition of European socialism has historically less resonance in either the UK or 
Ireland due an absence of an anti-clerical tradition and the different relationships between 
church and state, especially in Britain. Indeed, Christian Socialism has its historical and 
ideological roots in England – a philosophy that merges a religious compassion for one’s 
neighbours with a political predilection for fairness and equality. But does that dimension 
have significance for the focus of our study? We should not confuse the absence of Christian 
Democracy in the anglo-sphere of Europe with a lack of importance of religion in the public 
sphere – indeed, on the contrary, a lack of a social movement mobilised, as Christian 
Democrats were, post-war, to protect the Church from the Government, is potentially a sign 
of strength, not weakness (see Steven 2010).     
 Religion, then, can be a source of great division in society but it can also provide us 
with ways of tackling collective action problems and other fundamental social dilemmas – 
and the British and Irish contexts are particularly interesting in this respect. Christian values 
and party political policy platforms can often be inter-related, especially in reference to 
ethical and rights-based questions. The partisan and electoral role of religion – while 
inevitably multi-faceted - can perhaps be contrasted with the more prominent behaviour of 
religion in internal relations and conflict. Here, recent studies have tended to emphasise the 
way religious beliefs act as a source of social change – and how policy-makers must act in 
response to this (see Rehman 2007). However, in focusing more on the civil society role of 
religion and its place within wider political participation, we can see its potential for aiding 
co-operation and consensus, rather than simply a social phenomenon which must be 
controlled. In this respect, the work of American political scientist and public policy 
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professor, Robert Putnam, is key (2000; 2010). Putnam argues that Christianity - within the 
appropriate domestic context of an advanced industrial society - is ultimately a source of 
bridging ‘social capital’ and inclusivity, rather than a negative commodity. In particular, 
religious citizens are much more likely to vote, identify with a particular political party, and 
participate in charitable work: ‘churches and other religious organizations have a unique 
importance in American civil society’, according to Putnam (2000: 65) He argues that ‘faith 
communities in which people worship together are arguably the single most important 
repository of social capital in America’ (2000: 66). Yet how does this compare with the 
Western European context? Linked to this, how closely do the beliefs and values of Europe’s 
elected politicians correspond to those of Europe’s voters? By analysing religion, we can use 
the case study as the basis of a deeper discussion of the ‘quality of democracy’ within the 
European Union.   
 The European Union promotes a narrative of cohesion, convergence and unity which 
explicitly encompasses democratic beliefs and values. Meanwhile, the European Parliament 
seeks to democratically represent interests of all sections of society, including both church 
attendees and non-believers. Yet how effectively does it do this – and how realistic is that 
objective in the first place? Are party groups consistent when it comes to approaching policy 
issues such as bio-ethics or the fight against religious discrimination? And how do the UK 
and Ireland fit into this governance environment, given their relatively distinctive ‘anglo-
sphere’ contribution to the European level of electoral and party politics?    
 There are other wider themes upon which the research touches. Britain has long 
provided scholars interested in the interface between politics and religion with a distinctive 
case. Uniquely, the UK has an unwritten constitution with no bill of rights, senior clergy 
sitting in the upper house of Parliament in London and, as has already been noted, no 
confessional parties. Britain has also long provided scholars interested in European 
integration with an unusual case - one of the ‘big three’ member states along with France 
and Germany, yet also traditionally the most Euro-sceptic and most ‘awkward partner’ for 
the Euro-crats in Brussels (see George 1998). This article examines how these two 
dimensions relate to one another – for example, we know that previous research shows a 
correlation between Euro-scepticism and Protestantism (Foret and Itçaina 2011). Such an 
analysis is made even more interesting by including the responses of Irish MEPs. The 
Republic of Ireland, while geographically close to the UK, is a quite divergent case, both in 
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relation to its religious heritage and its attitudes towards European integration. Ireland is 
one of the EU’s most devoutly Roman Catholic member states, and also one of its most pro-
European (European Commission 2011). Nevertheless, the UK and Ireland also have much in 
common and the data garnered from the survey questionnaire sample allow us to highlight 
where there exist obvious patterns or trends. Perhaps of even more importance will be 
wider comparisons with other member states included in this Religion at the European 
Parliament (RelEP) project, http://www.releur.eu/ - namely Austria, France, Germany, The 
Netherlands, Poland and Spain.  
    
The survey questionnaire 
The main instrument used for collecting data about the religious preferences of the British 
and Irish MEPs was a survey questionnaire, controlled centrally by the Institute for 
European Studies at the Université Libre de Bruxelles. The survey was divided up into a 
number of different sections based around a range of themes connected to religious issues 
and European government affairs. A first set of questions gathered information on the 
socio-political profile of the MEPs i.e. their nationality, age, national party political 
membership and European political grouping, seniority in the European Parliament in 
relation to terms served, and their participation in the Parliament’s various policy 
committees. A second set of questions dealt with MEPs’ view of the impact of religion on 
the way the European Parliament works specifically as an institution. The purpose here was 
to establish whether or not religion as an inherently multi-dimensional variable has any 
effects on the overall functioning of the Parliament. A third set of questions tackled religion 
in the political practice and political socialization of MEPs more personally and individually. 
The influence of religion with the political process is to be understood firstly in terms of the 
frequency with which a representative takes religion into account when framing and 
formulating public policy, and secondly, whether or not this process is as source of personal 
inspiration, or of a more practical nature linked to lobbying and the activities of interest 
groups and consultations.  A fourth set of questions investigated the precise policy sectors 
and thematic debates where religion is the most salient as an issue on the European 
agenda. Fundamental rights, cultural and ethical problems and external relations are all 
areas where we can expect religious actors and issues to be involved. As an ‘identity 
resource’ - for example as a reference to the Christian heritage of Europe in treaties - 
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religion cannot avoid polarisation between those who are in favour, and those who are 
against, or at least less sympathetic. The fifth and final part of the questionnaire looked at 
the religious preferences of MEPs in terms of beliefs, practices and attitudes. Questions 
from international values surveys (European Social Survey, European Values Survey, 
Eurobarometers) are utilised in order to provide a standard against which to assess the 
religious profile of MEPs compared with the average European voter.  
 Christianity plays a historically important part in the civic life of European nations so 
how do MEPs approach the influence and power of the Church? How sensitive is the 
European Parliament to religious issues and matters of faith? Religion – via Christianity - can 
be said to be core to European identity, uniting different nationalities when language can 
sometimes divide them. Yet how does the European Union approach religion, especially its 
most democratic and representative arm, the European Parliament? While previous 
research has focused on the way faith-based groups lobby the European Commission in 
Brussels, the survey questionnaire allows us to quantify and measure political influence 
much more scientifically. The policy analysis approach mentioned before is understandable 
– the role of interest groups in EU government is arguably more prominent than the role of 
parties and elections. Even since the European Parliament has been handed more powers, 
the Commission has remained Europe’s central political institution and ‘engine of 
integration’. As scholars have attempted to untangle the place of religion in the EU, they 
have looked first to the role of the Council of European Churches, for example, as well to 
treaties and constitutional reforms (see Leustean and Madeley 2011). Yet the arena of the 
European Parliament can no longer be ignored, especially given its overtly representative 
democratic remit.  
 Are religious interests, then, represented effectively by MEPs? Does a ‘quality of 
democracy’ audit of the Parliament reveal any biases in public policy-making? Freedom of 
religion is one of the core principles actively promoted by the EU in its neighbourhood policy 
(ENP), and embraced especially enthusiastically by democratically elected MEPs – yet is 
freedom of religion protected within the borders of the EU by those same elected party 
politicians? One of the great criticisms levelled at the EU is that it has failed to create a 
functioning public sphere with a European civic society. Interest groups may well lobby at a 
European level but rarely exclusively – rather, they maintain one eye on their own national 
policy environments. Ironically, despite its denominations, the Christian Church’s structure 
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lends itself naturally to a European-wide system of governance, and can be seen as an 
enabler of Europe from the ‘bottom-up’. While churches can hardly be said to ‘democratise’ 
the EU, their capacity for creating healthy social capital and community engagement is often 
the envy of many political parties and politicians (see Dalton and Wattenberg 2002). Linked 
to that, their ability to stimulate public debate and mobilise public opinion about moral and 
ethical questions is also considerable. So how do our European politicians respond? 
 
(1) Profiles of the Members of the European Parliament 
We start by examining the profiles of the British and Irish MEPs. 19 politicians out of a total 
84 responded to the survey questionnaire. This represents 23% overall, including 22% of 
British members (16 out of 73) and 25% of Irish members (3 out of 12). This type of 
response rate is typical of an elite survey of this nature, and is large enough to allow us to 
draw wider conclusions about what British and Irish MEPs think about religious issues, 
especially when there is unanimity or near unanimity of responses, as there frequently is 
with many of the questions involved. Taken as a whole, we are definitely able to track 
certain patterns of attitudes and behaviour. Fortunately, the 19 respondents represent a 
range of different party groupings, terms served and committee specialism. 
Five Liberal Democrats, four Conservatives, three Labour members, three UK 
Independence Party members, one Scottish Nationalist, one Fianna Fail member, one Irish 
Socialist and one Independent participated in the survey. With the Independent and Fianna 
Fail MEP joining together with the Liberal Democrats, that meant the largest parliamentary 
group represented were the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). The 
obvious point to make in addition to the above is the absence of MEPs from the European 
People’s Party (EPP) – this was a combination of no Christian Democrat presence in the UK, 
and a lack of Fine Gael politicians in Ireland taking part in the survey. Nine out of 19 
members were elected in the 1999-2004 term, with the next biggest intake (five) coming in 
2004-2009. Two were elected for the first time only in 2009, while three were first elected 
back in 1994. Two of the respondents have since resigned as MEPs, while one has changed 
political party. A range of parliamentary committees are represented by the respondents – 
in total, 14 out of 23 – with three vice-chairs included in the sample.  We will not seek to 
overly-emphasise the differences between the British and Irish members for the purposes of 
this particular piece of research – ultimately, they can effectively be joined and analysed 
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together, as we can detect common responses to the various survey questions throughout. 
No one question produced a serious divergence between the UK and Irish members.  
 These data collectively allow us to draw accurate conclusions about the wider 
religious views of British and Irish MEPs. It is highly unlikely that their basic responses to the 
questions would be dramatically different to the majority of issues, as there is often 
agreement amongst the respondents. Clearly, a larger response rate would have produced 
more detail and explanations but, for our purposes, we can still evaluate the underlying 
values and attitudes on display, and make a valid contribution to the literature on politics 
and religion; EU politics; interest groups; and electoral and partisan politics.   
 
(2) Religion and the work of the European Parliament  
The second section of questions analyses collective religious identities; political or partisan 
identities; and also national identities. Do MEPs act with religion in mind at any point? 
Theories of ‘belonging’, loyalty and group representation are all explored in depth. The 
European Parliament is the European institution where these MEPs operate so their 
perceptions of how the legislature operates in relation to religious matters can be insightful. 
 
   








In response to question one, we see a marginal majority arguing that ‘religion does have an 
effect on the functioning of the European Parliament’. This shows that, while British and 
Irish MEPs are content to admit that religion is relevant, there is obviously some hesitancy 
and caution as well to admit that the functioning of the Parliament is profoundly affected by 
religion in terms of how it works. The response to this first question can be considered a 
typical theme that runs through the responses to other relevant questions, as well.   
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Question two focused on the effect of religion on parliamentary party groups. It asked the 
MEPs to choose from one of the following responses: ‘religion reinforces the identity of 
each political group’; religion blurs the identity of each political group’; or religion has no 
effect on the identity of each political group’. Five MEPs chose the first option, one chose 
the second while 11 chose the last. So far, then, MEPs are reluctant to credit religion with 
too much influence on the specifically partisan and electoral activities of the European 
Parliament. A clear majority felt that religion had no effect here, despite the fact the largest 
group, the European People’s Party is made up predominantly of Christian Democrat (CD) 
politicians. Europe may well be a ‘Christian Democratic’ project with founding fathers such 
as Robert Schumann and Konrad Adenauer prominent CD politicians but it would appear 
that political cleavage does not dominate the thinking of the MEPs in the way that we might 

















The responses to question three elucidated much more information. The third question 
asked MEPs whether they felt religion had a different importance depending on the 
nationality of individual MEPs. Here, with one exception all respondents said ‘yes’, they did 
feel nationality was relevant.  This seems reasonable – Europe may be secularised but there 
are many member states which remain highly religious, including Ireland, but also Poland, 
Slovakia and Italy. Their MEPs do not come to Strasbourg or Brussels regarding religion as 
irrelevant – on the contrary they arrive in Brussels and Strasbourg highly conscious of the 
influence of religion on the civil societies in their home countries. 
 
V004 - Does religion create differences between MEPs who are Catholic, Protestant, 








The final question in this section asked MEPs whether they felt religion created 
denominational differences between Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox politicians? Here, a 
slight majority said ‘no’, they did not feel that, but with six MEPs feeling that it did. So it 
would appear that any perception that religion causes divisions in the Parliament are not 
accurate, but that pre-existing identities, especially national identities, do play a part. 
European politics and government do not drive a wedge between Protestants and Catholics, 
and again, we should not be surprised by that. In modern societies across the EU like Britain 
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and Ireland, the most fundamental difference now lies between faith and atheism or 
agnosticism, rather than between Christian denominations.     
Our key conclusion, then, in this second part of the survey is that national identity 
does very much appear have a role to play in EU politics and governance. The member state 
from which the MEP originates is perceived to be a significant factor when it comes to 
influencing his or her policy decisions. We can conclude, then, that MEPs are conscious of 
the nation state and civil society which they are representing. Indeed, we can even go so far 
as to say that the national identity of an MEP is perceived to be more significant than their 
partisan identity when it comes to issues of a religious nature. Civil society, then, is present 
in the European Parliament. National and religious identities are closely inter-twined, at 
times – and recognisably so by the responses of these British and Irish MEPs.  
 
(3) Religion and the work of Members of the European Parliament 
This section contained six questions in total, focusing on the work of individual MEPs, rather 
than the parliament as a whole.  
 


















Question five asked the MEPs whether or not they ever ‘take religion into account’ when 
formulating policy and voting? The response was relatively negative – seven respondents 
stated that they never took religion into account, while six stated they rarely took religion 
into account. Nevertheless, a total of six MEPs stated that they either permanently or often 




V006 - If religion intervenes in your activity as an MEP, is it (several responses possible):? 
 
 






























Question six was much more descriptive in tone. It focused on how religion intervenes in the 
activities of MEPs – practically, personally or philosophically? Eight British and Irish MEPs 
said that it intervenes as a ‘social and political reality’ – the most popular response – while 
four stated it intervened more as a ‘source of personal inspiration’, and four ‘as an interest 
group’. This response is very interesting – it shows rational, office-seeking politicians only 
encountering religion when they are forced to engage with it as a social movement or a 
pressure group. Relatively few MEPs are willing to openly admit that they mix religion and 



















Question seven asked MEPs to consider the effects of multi-level governance. Was the place 
of religion in the European Parliament different from their experiences in national politics 
and government? However, the answer was far from conclusive – eight stated they did not 
know, seven that it was not, and only four that it was, so we cannot really infer much from 
that type of reply, overall. While a number of the respondents had served at different levels 
of government in the UK and Ireland, they clearly did not feel they had sufficient expertise 
to answer the question properly.  
 
V008 - Has your experience at the European Parliament changed your views on the 







Question eight asked MEPs to consider whether or not their experience of being elected to 
the European Parliament had changed their views on the relationship between religion and 
politics more widely. 15 stated ‘no’ that there had been no change in views overall – a 
categorical answer, and one that should not be surprising. Again, it is highly unlikely that 
elected politicians from parties would admit that they have changed their mind over such an 






V009 - How often are you in contact with religious or philosophical interest groups? 
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Question nine focused on lobbying – how often were the MEPs in contact with religious or 
philosophical interest groups? Six – the largest number - stated that they were in contact 
with religious interest groups over the course of a parliamentary term, but with a total of 
eight stating that they were in contact either once a week, once a month or a few times a 
year. We can say, therefore, that most of our British and Irish MEPs have been lobbied by 
religious or faith-based organisations at some point, which is an important point to note. 
Question 10, meanwhile, generated a number of interesting examples of the sort of groups 
with which the MEPs have been in contact, with a slight bias toward local faith-based groups 
or churches operating in the regional constituency of the politicians. 
Overall, then, we see that MEPs are clearly able to function independently but are 
also consulted regularly by faith-based organisations and churches. Religious 
representatives are certainly listened to respectfully, but beyond that, there is no admission 
from MEPs that they are given undue influence. They are given their place, but no more. 
MEPs appear, at times, to approach this from a member state perspective i.e. if they have a 
constituent that is active in a group, then that will potentially help with gaining access. But 
there is no hint at all that religious or faith-based groups are given special privileges or 
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access to the corridors of power in Brussels or Strasbourg beyond what one might 
reasonably expect.  
 Again, this seems eminently reasonable – even in a member state like the Republic 
of Ireland, where weekly Roman Catholic church attendances at mass remain high (Iona 
Institute 2011), voters and politicians are also keen to stress the separation of church and 
state. Irish parties and politicians in Dublin promote the image of a forward-looking 
democracy, and in that sense, any attempts by the Catholic Church to exert too much 
authority are likely to be resisted. Where MEPs are fortunate in this respect, however, is 
that abortion – the Catholic Church’s number one policy priority – is not in the policy 
domain of the European Union, so the desire for the Church to lobby European politicians 
over that issue is diminished significantly. Same sex marriage is also ultimately a policy issue 
reserved to the member states, despite the evolution of social policy within the work of the 
EU and especially the Commission and Parliament. 
 
(4) Religion and the work of the European Union 
In this section, MEPs were asked six short but related questions about the EU itself, and 























V011 - Which are the issues on which religion is most important at the European Parliament? 
(please rank the three first responses in order of importance*) 
 








































  *figures represent aggregate totals of issues identified  
 
The most popular reply to question 11 was that the ‘fight against discrimination’ was the 
policy area where religion is the most important. We can surmise that this is partly because 
discrimination can have both an internal and external policy focus for the MEPs. However, 
we also note the popularity of the response to social policy and freedom of expression. So, 
generally, we can say that the MEPs relate religion primarily to these types of rights and 














Question 12 inquired whether the MEPs felt the EU should have a ‘real policy’ towards 
religions. 12 replied negatively, while six replied positively. There appears to be no appetite, 
then, on the part of MEPs for a European Constitution mentioning religion, or for the 
Commission in Brussels to develop a strategy for engaging more with Christianity or Islam 
institutionally or collectively.  
 







Question 13, meanwhile, asked the MEPs whether they felt that the Lisbon Treaty should 
have made reference to Europe’s Christian heritage. Again, a clear majority stated they did 
not think this, which would be consistent with the other findings. We can perhaps note the 
peculiar British context that is probably relevant here, however – the views expressed by 
Pope Benedict XI and also Angela Merkel that Europe’s heritage should be acknowledged 
(see Traynor 2007), would not find much popularity within the UK context, where the whole 














Question 14 is a key one – MEPs were asked whether they felt religion has a role to play in 
the way Turkey’s candidature for accession to the European Union. Almost all replied that 
‘yes’, religion was relevant. While we do not know if the MEPs feel that this is a good or a 
bad thing, it is a striking finding nonetheless.  
 







Related to this, question 15 asks whether religion has a role to play in the external relations 
of the European Union. Here, there was a split amongst the respondents – half felt it did 
have a role to play, while half felt that it did not. The slightly open-ended nature of the 
question may have led to some hesitancy here.  
 
V016 - The President of the European Parliament regularly meets with representatives of 








Finally, there was a question (16) that focused on the specific work of the President of the 
European Parliament, Martin Schulz MEP. Obviously, Mr Schulz, a German Social Democrat, 
regularly meets with representatives of major European religions to discuss current affairs, 
but was this a good thing? ‘Yes’ replied a majority of respondents.  
 The perception amongst all MEPs concerning external relations is that European 
neighbourhood policy and enlargement, especially with regard to the accession of Turkey, is 
heavily influenced by religious factors. Again, then, we see civil society factors gaining 
prominence within the sphere of the European Parliament. The accession of Turkey has 
many pros and many cons, with economic as well as population variables at play – for 
example, if Turkey were to join it would be second only to Germany in population size. But 
our MEPs are clear that the EU’s distinctive civilian foreign policy can only go so far – Turkey 
may be a long-standing political candidate for accession to the Union, but its civil society 
appears to be a big barrier for many MEPs. European integration is indeed a Christian 
project, it would appear, in this respect. Yet this is not the formal explanation for why 
Turkey has not yet acceded to the EU. According to various actors, geography rather than 
religion is the most salient factor - but this seems a somewhat partial interpretation 
(European Commission 2013). Even related issues to do with women’s rights can be linked 
to religion. MEPs were not asked to comment on whether they thought this was a good 
thing or not - nevertheless, the clarity of response is an interesting finding. MEPs are 
perhaps able to speak more openly here because they know they are line broadly with 
public opinion in their home member states (European Commission 2007).  
 
(5) The values, beliefs and social attitudes of Members of the European Parliament 
Finally, this section of the survey questionnaire investigated the values and religious beliefs 
of the British and Irish MEPs.  
 








Question 17 asked the MEPs whether they felt they ‘belonged ‘to a religious denomination, 
with just over half responding positively and just under half negatively.  
  







































In terms of the nine who responded positively to question 17, five MEPs identified as Roman 










V019 - Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend 












once a month 
 
0 
once a week 
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In question 19, the British and Irish MEPs were asked how often they attended religious 
services. Eight replied that they attended church either more than once a week, once a 
month or only on holy days.  
 
V020 - Independently of whether you go to Church or not, how would you define yourself? 
 
I am a religious person 
 
4 
I am not a religious person 
 
4 








In question 20, four stated they were a religious person, but nine said that they were not a 
believer. We can relate those responses to those given in questions 18 and 19, and identify 
wider patterns of behaviour representative of voters in the UK, in particular. While people 
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are often happy to identify as Christian, their attendance at church and institutional or 
practical attachment to religion is less consistent (see Voas and Ling 2010). 
 
V021 - Which of these statements comes closest to your beliefs? 
 
There is a personal God 
 
6 




I don’t believe there is any 






   
In response to question 21, we also see patterns that reflect wider public opinion. The MEPs 
are basically divided over whether or not God exists. This is interesting as it shows they are 
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 In relation to the multiple choice question 22 on values contained at the end of the 
survey, a clear bias was shown towards a liberal inclusiveness – for example, politicians who 
do not believe in God were still very much considered fit for office. Religious leaders should 
not try to unduly influence how people vote in elections. It would not be better if more 
people in Europe with strong religious beliefs held public office. Religious leaders should not 
influence government decisions. A nurse should be able to refuse to conduct an abortion on 
religious grounds if he or she feels that way. The MEPs, then, can be said to be highly 
representative of wider British and Irish society. Their views are very mainstream, liberal 
and pluralistic. We see our MEPs seeking to be as moderate and as inclusive as possible. In 
that sense, they are highly representative of their societies – the role of religion in British 
society remains central but not dominant.  
 The Church of England is established, and its prelates sit and vote in the British 
Parliament in London. The last census showed an overwhelming response indentifying with 
Christianity. Protestant evangelical churches in urban areas are growing in popularity. The 
decline in British church attendance since the 1960s is well-documented – however, there is 
still a large number of people who do go to church (Barley 2006). Linked to this, while there 
has been a decline in the number of Britons who believe in God over the same period, a 
substantial number still do so. Clearly, defining ‘belief in God’ is problematic – for example, 
the 2008 British Social Attitudes Survey created six categories of belief, including relatively 
ambiguous answers such as ‘I don’t believe in a personal God but I do believe in a higher 
power of some kind’ (Park et al 2010: 68). But once again, we can be clear that substantial 
numbers of Britons possess some sort of Christian value system – no matter how vaguely 
defined.  
The number of people who identify with one denomination also remains high. In the 
last government census (2001), 37.3 million people in England and Wales described 
themselves as ‘Christian’. In the UK as whole, 76.8 per cent of people stated that they were 
Christian, with 22.2 per cent identifying as Anglican (13.4 million). In Scotland, people were 
asked their specific denomination, with 2.1 million answering ‘Church of Scotland’, and a 
total of 3.3 million as ‘Christian’. There is an estimated Muslim population of around 3 per 
cent. The 2001 Census was the first time that the question ‘what is your religion?’ had been 
asked in Great Britain (excluding Northern Ireland). While this makes comparisons over time 
difficult, the 2001 data nevertheless shows the continuing strength of church identity, if not 
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necessarily of regular Sunday morning church attendance.  So politicians, including MEPs, 
must be respectful of the place of Christianity in the development of British democracy, 
without necessarily being seen to being under its control. 
 
Conclusion 
Analysing the survey responses from MEPs from the UK and Ireland collectively provides us 
with some interesting patterns of political behaviour – from below (civil society), from 
above (international community) and ‘in the middle’ (interest groups). If we examine the 
first of these perspectives, we can note that MEPs are no more or less secularised than the 
wider population, and are representative of ordinary Europeans. In terms of the ‘middle’, 
we can state that religious organisations are influential in the EU, and that religion, 
therefore still has power, although there are no hidden agendas either, at least none that 
are detectable via a survey. In terms of externally, the EU is perhaps at its most ‘religious’ 
when it is looking beyond its boundaries – for example, enlargement and the accession of 
Turkey.  
 With religious political issues, then, we see Europe’s elected politicians ‘follow the 
votes’ (see Downs 1957): religion as a freedom of expression is encouraged and supported 
as being a ‘norm’, while religion as an identity or group belief is handled carefully. So when 
it comes to discriminating against EU citizens because of their religious beliefs, our MEPs are 
naturally against such behaviour. We also see in their responses that MEPs are happy to 
recognise the importance of religion as a social and a political reality. Meanwhile, when it 
comes to identity, we see politicians treading softly. It would also be wrong to conclude that 
just because some of the survey responses indicate that MEPs do not regularly take religion 
into account, that religion is therefore entirely irrelevant. In this sense, we can evaluate that 
MEPs are as much in touch with their electorates and constituents as MPs. They understand 
the importance of representing the civil society out of which they come. They communicate 
an inclusive approach that signals a willingness to try and be as representative as possible. 
This can be broadly regarded as a successful aspect of the work of the European Parliament 
as it tries to represent the civil society and public sphere Europe. The status of religious 
lobbies within the EU can be said to broadly respected but no more and no less prominent 
than other groups, organisations or interests. Freedom of religion is indeed protected and 
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supported but not if it impacts upon the freedoms of other European citizens – for example, 
in relation to human sexuality, gender discrimination or abortion.     
 ‘Multiple modernities’ (Eisenstadt 2000) can be said to summarise this approach - a 
Europe for all, with different groups co-existing alongside each other. The EU neither denies 
its rich Christian heritage nor does it trumpet it as central to its existence. Its politicians 
merely deal with religious issues on an individual basis. Society is present, then, at the 
supra-national level of the complex system of multi-level governance operated by the 
European Union. Social capital can be linked to civilisation and political culture referred to 
by Eisenstadt. The scholarly literature from social scientists on religion has shifted quite 
significantly since the new orthodoxy arrived in the 1960s proclaiming that religion was no 
longer of interest – and in many ways, it is Eisenstadt who has gradually come to personify 
that shift, arguing that in modern advanced industrial democracies like the UK, different sets 
of values co-exist alongside one another, and disagreeing with the idea that secularisation is 
an irreversible and inevitable trend. Eisenstadt criticises scholars who ‘assumed, even only 
implicitly, that the cultural program of modernity as it developed in modern Europe and the 
basic institutional constellations that emerged there would ultimately take over in all 
modernizing and modern societies’ (2000: 1). 
 So elected European politicians always seek to represent public opinion and place 
themselves in the mainstream, in exactly the same way as national party politicians do.  
MEPs can be said to be no more or no less sympathetic to churches and faith groups than 
any other level of modern society. Church populations are falling – they remain significant, 
but they do not have the power that they once had, and it remains to be seen whether they 
will again in the future. Our MEPs tread a moderate line between respecting religion but not 
necessarily adhering to religious views which, at times in Europe, can be peripheral. Europe 
presently leads the world in secularism – it is the only part of the globe where church 
attendances are not rising (see Norris and Inglehart 2004). Europe is the historic home of 
Christianity but it is also now the home of atheism and agnosticism. We should not be 
surprised that the European Parliament attempts to reconcile those two spheres - it makes 
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